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Motivational Analysis as a Complete
Explanation of the Justification
Process
SCOTT H. BICE*
As Professors Simon' and Clark2 both recognize, constitutional
law has developed in significant degree into a process of differen-
tial justification. Once a person challenging the constitutionality
of governmental action has passed the threshold of justiciability,3
courts ask the government to justify the challenged action, impos-
ing different standards of justification in various contexts. Clark
and Simon both acknowledge that the purpose of this justification
process can be stated in at least two different ways. First, the
function of justification could be to convince the court that the
constitutionally negative effects of the challenged action are out-
weighed by the constitutionally positive effects. In other words,
the purpose of the justification process could be to show that a
constitutionally acceptable "balance" or accommodation of com-
peting interests has been achieved. Under this view, the standard
of justification the government must meet depends on the nature
* Professor of Law, University of Southern California. B.S., 1965; J.D., Univer-
sity of Southern California, 1968.
1. Simon, Racially Prejudiced Governmental Actions: A Motivation Theory of
the Constitutional Ban Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1041
(1978).
2. Clark, Legislative Motivation and Fundamental Rights in Constitutional
Law, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 953 (1978).
3. The challenger also might have to pass the threshold of "liberty" or of
"property." See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 564 (1971). See generally Michelman, Formal and Associational Aims in
Procedural Due Process, in NOMOS XVIII DuE PROCESS 126 (1977).
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and magnitude of the constitutionally negative effects that the
court recognizes: the greater those effects, the more important or
"compelling" the governmental interests must be, and the more
"necessary" the challenged action must be to furthering those in-
terests.4
On the other hand, the purpose of justification could be to
prove that the government's action is not "caused by constitution-
ally illicit considerations" or, stated slightly differently, does not
"have the purpose of furthering" constitutionally illicit goals or in-
terests. Under this view, the standard of justification initially im-
posed5 depends on the extent to which the mere fact of the
government's action is probative of illicit motivation. The more
probative the mere fact of the action is, the greater burden of jus-
tification the government initially must meet to convince the
court that illicit motivation did not cause the government's action.
Although Simon and Clark both argue for the second or "moti-
vational" view of the justification process, there is a significant
difference in the scope of their respective arguments. Professor
Simon limits his argument for the motivational view to cases in-
volving racial equal protection. Professor Clark is more expansive,
arguing for the motivational view in equal protection generally
and in the first amendment, and indicating that it may well be the
appropriate view in many other areas of constitutional law. Thus,
their claims for the motivational view of the justification process
have different force. Nevertheless, claims for the superiority and
for the sufficiency of the motivational view are common to both
articles, and it is to these claims that I wish to address my brief
comment.
THE JUSTIFICATION PROCESS IN RAcIAL EQUAL PROTECTION
Simon is fairly persuasive in arguing that proof that racial
prejudice (as he defines it) caused governmental action should be
a sufficient condition for judicial invalidation of the action. As his
detailed discussion shows, there are difficult evidentiary
problems in establishing this showing, but mainly for the reasons
he gives, these problems probably are not beyond the competency
of judicial resolution.6 He is less persuasive, however, in arguing
4. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 70 (1972)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
5. As Simon explains, an initially low standard of justification might be raised
if the person challenging the action presents other probative evidence that the ac-
tion was caused by illicit motivation.
6. The remaining ambiguity in Simon's analysis is identifying whose racial
prejudice is relevant in determining whether racial prejudice caused the govern-
ment's action. As my colleague Norman Lane has asked, suppose that a racially
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that proof of his definition of racial prejudice is a necessary condi-
tion for judicial invalidation, and two objections should be consid-
ered in assessing whether his claim for the necessity of proving
racial prejudice also is convincing.
First, one could object that Simon has defined "racial
prejudice" too narrowly. Following the famous "color-blind" ra-
tionale, one might argue that racial "prejudice" is simply the atti-
tude that race is relevant to official decisionmaking, regardless of
whether racial distinctions are used to hurt or to help members of
minority racial groups.7 I cannot evaluate the validity of this view
of prejudice in any detail here, but it may be sufficient to note
that the major difficulty is that this definition would preclude all
attempts to use race as a criterion to remedy past prejudicial ac-
tion, even de jure action; for in Simon's terms, a finding that ra-
cial prejudice caused governmental action allows no justification.
Second, one might argue that the motivational view is not and
ought not to be a complete picture of the justification process in
racial equal protection. That is, one might accept Simon's defini-
tion of prejudice and agree that action caused by it should be in-
validated but argue that the justification process also serves, and
ought to serve, a balancing-of-effects function. In other words, one
would say that the justification process also serves to identify in-
stances in which the negative effects of governmental action are
sufficient basis for invalidation under 'racial" equal protection,
even though that action is not caused by racial prejudice.
How would such an argument proceed? First, one might argue
that the equal protection clause prohibits significant "dispropor-
tionate negative impacts" on minority racial groups, even if those
impacts are not "caused by racial prejudice."8 This is a most
troublesome line of argument, however. First, as Simon shows,
there will be few, if any, instances in which there will be signifi-
prejudiced citizen reports a crime to the police that he would not have reported
but for the fact that the perpetrator belonged to a racial minority. Assuming that
the report was a necessary condition for governmental action, do the arrest and
prosecution constitute government action caused by racial prejudice? If not, what
about governmental response to the economic consequences of the racial
prejudice of its citizens, such as a boycott of integrated facilities that reduces the
revenues from these facilities and causes them to run at a financial loss? Does
closing the financially troubled facilities constitute action caused by prejudice?
7. See, e.g, Posner, The DeFunis Case and the Constitutionality of Preferential
Treatment of Racial Minorities, 1974 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 22.
8. See, e.g., Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial
Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977).
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cant negative disportionate impacts on minority groups in the ab-
sence of racial prejudice. Hence the need for an additional
balancing analysis is difficult to perceive. Second, and perhaps
more important, the argument is tantamount to urging that gov-
ernment has an affirmative duty to take race into account and to
design its action so that racial groups are benefitted or burdened
proportionately. Recognition of this duty would perpetuate racial
consciousness and institutionalize decisionmaking along racial
lines, both of which may be viewed as inconsistent with the long-
term goals of the equal protection clause.
But there is another line of argument that could be advanced in
support of the view that the justification process serves a balanc-
ing function in racial equal protection. One would begin by urging
that while one point of the equal protection clause is to remove
racial prejudice from the process of governmental decisionmak-
ing, the clause should also be viewed as embodying a compatible
and more general goal: to create a society in which race is as rele-
vant to governmental decisionmaking as, for example, eye color is
presently. In other words, the general goal of the clause is to pro-
duce a society in which distinctions based on race are eliminated
from all but the most inconsequential of official decisionmaking.
Racially prejudiced action is, of course, prohibited, but nonpreju-
diced action that uses race as a decisionmaking criterion is never-
theless still suspect because of its tendency to foster race
consciousness, to ingrain stereotypical thinking, and to cause
competition and even hostility among racial groups, thus exacer-
bating the society's racist tendency to identify and then to judge
persons on the basis of the racial group to which they belong. To
say that nonprejudiced use of race is suspect is not to say that it
is invalid, however, because the clause recognizes that short-term
racial classifications and their consequences must sometimes be
endured to remedy past prejudicial action and to achieve the
long-term integrative goals of the clause.
In other words, one would argue that even the benign use of
race should be viewed as prima facie constitutionally undesirable
because, as a general proposition, the equal protection clause has
dedicated society to the irrelevance of race as a criterion for gov-
ernmental action.9 The purpose of the justification process thus
would be to convince the court that the government is neverthe-
less justified in considering race because it could not move to-
ward its acceptable nonprejudiced goals, including the ultimate
goal of racial irrelevance, by other reasonably feasible means.
9. See, e.g., Kaplan, Equal Justice in an Unequal World: Equality for the Ne-
gro-The Problem of Special Treatmen 61 Nw. U.L REv. 363, 379 (1966).
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Suppose, for example, that the government adopted an explicit ra-
cial quota for employment in a governmental agency, a quota re-
quiring that fifteen percent of its employees at all levels be
members of racial minorities. Under a motivational analysis, the
court would ask only whether prejudice caused the use of the ra-
cial quota. Viewed in a broader perspective, the justification proc-
ess also would require the court to determine whether other
reasonably feasible means existed of achieving an integrated
work force.
This balancing process would require the court to assess the ex-
tent to which other selection criteria and other recruitment meth-
ods would serve to produce a reasonably integrated work force in
the agency. Thus the court might ask, contrary to the Supreme
Court's and Professor Simon's analyses of Morton v. Mancari,o
whether the Bureau of Indian Affairs' use of an explicit racial
preference not only is truly benign but also is an acceptable com-
promise between the negative effects of overt racial classifica-
tions and the government's positive goals. The court might
conclude that upgrading the education the federal government
provides is, on balance, preferable to an explicit racial classifica-
tion even though, as Simon points out, this would be a less effec-
tive method of increasing the representation of Indians in the
Bureau of Indian Affairs. Similarly, in the case of preferential ra-
cial admissions programs, the court would seek to determine
whether there were reasonably feasible criteria other than race
that would serve the legitimate goals of the admissions program. I
do not mean to indicate that Morton was necessarily wrongly de-
cided, or that the California Supreme Court reached the right re-
sult in Bakke v. Regents of the University of California,"' but
rather only to indicate that there is a plausible additional analysis
for the court to undertake even though it is satisfied that the ra-
cial preference is not the result of racial prejudice.
Whether the justification process is viewed only in motivational
terms or in both motivational and balancing terms thus can have
an impact on the case outcomes. Motivational analysis will lead to
the validation of nonprejudiced action which an additional balanc-
10. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
11. 18 Cal 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S.
1090 (1977) (No. 76.811).
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ing analysis might invalidate. Is such a balancing analysis appro-
priate in racial equal protection?
The issue is one of institutional competence. First, I think that
the equal protection clause should be read as cautioning against
the use of racial criteria, not simply because such criteria are
likely to be the result of racial prejudice but also because, at least
in the short term, they often can cause the constitutionally nega-
tive effects of promoting race consciousness, competition among
racial groups, and political organization along racial lines, and
thus often hinder achievement of the ultimate objectives of the
clause. Thus initial decisionmakers should attempt to avoid draw-
ing distinctions based on race, utilizing such distinctions only
where other distinctions simply will not suffice to achieve impor-
tant non-racial goals or to achieve the long-term positive goal of
racial irrelevance in governmental decisionmaking.
But even accepting this view of the equal protection clause, the
question still remains whether the judicial role should be limited
to determining that racial prejudice did not cause the govern-
ment's action, or whether it should also include an evaluation of
whether the initial decisionmaker has made an appropriate ac-
commodation between the negative and the positive effects of the
racial classification. The argument in favor of limiting the judicial
role to the search for racial prejudice is two-fold. First, in the ab-
sence of prejudice, there is no need for the substitution of judicial
judgment for the political judgment that the positive effects out-
weigh the negative effects. Once it is determined that the govern-
ment's action is not the result of racial prejudice, the two
justifications of judicial intervention, stigma and process distor-
tion, no longer are present. The use of race, no different from the
use of any other criteria, involves debatable trade-offs about
which the judiciary has no special competence. Second, because
principles are difficult if not impossible to announce when the ju-
diciary balances positive and negative effects, the judiciary will
be unable to produce principled guidelines to tell well-intentioned
decisionmakers when they may use race as a criterion. Reason-
able minds, of course, can differ, but on balance neither of these
objections to judicial review of the nonprejudiced use of race
seems decisive.
The problems of ad hoc balancing do not seem more difficult
than the problems of ad hoc decisionmaking involved in the par-
ticularized and individualized judgments that the motivational
theory requires the courts to make. If a positive reason exists for
the judiciary to act as a brake on the nonprejudiced use of race as
a decisionmaking criterion, the fact that the judicial review in-
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volves a balancing or an accommodating of interests should not
by itself preclude this function.
However, the lack of process distortion is far more troublesome.
In the absence of racial prejudice-and hence of the distortion of
the political process-why should the courts substitute their judg-
ment about the utility of using race as a decisionmaking criterion
for the judgment of the political branches? The answer must be,
simply, that sufficient reason exists to believe that the political
branches may be insensitive to the negative effects of a racial
classification and its threat to the ultimate goals of the equal pro-
tection clause, so that a relatively unpolitical and more sensitive
check on the necessity for the use of racial criteria is desirable.
Why would the political branches be insensitive? Often the initial
nonprejudiced use of a racial classification will seem politically
desirable because the impacts on the majority race will be slight
and will be limited to a small, and perhaps politically impotent,
segment of this race. The political response to others who may
complain about the special treatment of a racial group often is not
to eliminate the first preference but to grant others. This step-by-
step process can lead to an officially racially classified society in
which each racial group qua racial group vies for its "proportion-
ate" share in a number of important areas.
Because they are more isolated from interest and pressure
groups and hence are more capable of taking the longer view, the
courts can act as an important brake on this political tendency to-
ward racial classification and polarization. Courts can require
government to show that a substantial need exists to employ ra-
cial criteria, that reasonably feasible alternatives have been ex-
plored and are unsatisfactory, and that race is in effect being
employed reluctantly. The courts also can require periodic show-
ings that a racial classification continues to be justified.
Whether the judiciary should do more than invalidate action
caused by racial prejudice doubtless is a very close issue. If one
believes that the judiciary can play a beneficial role in casting a
skeptical eye on the nonprejudiced use of race, the search for il-
licit motivation would not be the sole function of the justification
process. The justification process in racial equal protection would
have both motivational and balancing functions. Motivational
analysis would be used for two purposes. First, as Simon de-
scribes, it would be used to determine whether racial prejudice
1137
caused the action. If the answer is in the affirmative, no further
analysis is required, and the action should be invalidated.
Second, if the action does not use race overtly, motivational
analysis would be used to determine whether government is co-
vertly using race as a decisionmaking criterion. For example, an
employment test producing a disproportionately large number of
minority workers might be challenged as a covert means of mak-
ing racial classifications, and motivational analysis would be used
to determine whether in fact the test was a covert racial classifi-
cation. If the test does not use race overtly or covertly, no further
analysis is needed, and the court should sustain the action.
If the court finds that a racial criterion has been employed, ei-
ther overtly or covertly, a further balancing analysis is required to
determine whether use of this criterion is justified. In our society,
the nonprejudiced use of race will often but not necessarily al-
ways be sustained as the only feasible way of remedying past
prejudiced action and of ultimately producing an integrated soci-
ety in which race will be irrelevant in official decisionmaking.
THE JUSTIFICATION PROCESS IN THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Clark and Simon both suggest that the motivational view of the
justification process may be the correct and complete view in all
areas of "suspect classification" adjudication. For the reasons just
stated, although the motivational view may well have great ex-
planatory and normative force in these areas, it may well not pro-
vide a complete view of the justification process. It seems far less
likely that, as Clark argues, the motivational view provides a com-
plete description of the justification process in cases involving
fundamental interests or the first amendment.
Clark recognizes that the Court's opinions often explicitly adopt
language suggesting that the purpose of the justification process
in first amendment cases is a balancing of constitutionally rele-
vant effects. His argument seems to be that the results in the
cases also can often be understood in motivational terms and that
the courts would decide first amendment cases more appropri-
ately if they understood the justification process as a search for
illicit motivation. Clark argues that the first amendment is needed
"primarily to protect against invidiously motivated suppression of
unpopular points of view," and he urges that the justification
process should be aimed at determining whether governmental
action, including action barring speech because of its content, is
so motivated.
The key to this approach is, of course, in determining when the
purpose of suppressing or of punishing "given points of view" is
1138
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"invidiously motivated." Clark states, for example, that a law clas-
sifying on the basis of speech content is suspect of an "invidious
motivation" to suppress speech, and he argues that the suspicion
of Invidious motivation" can be rebutted only "by showing a
compelling state interest, an interest which is usually described
in terms of the likelihood the speech produces a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil the state has a right to prevent." This
example and Clark's other examples of disproving "invidious mo-
tivation" seem to make clear that the "invidiousness" of the de-
sire to suppress speech is to be determined by analysis of the
scope of the constitutional protection of expression. In other
words, the desire to suppress speech becomes "invidious" only
when the suppression is not a proper balance or accommodation
of first amendment and other regulatory values. If this is so, it is
not clear what is gained by talking of the justification process in
motivational terms.
Motivation analysis could describe part of the justification proc-
ess in first amendment cases if the courts were willing to go be-
hind the terms of the legislation and determine whether the real
purpose of the legislation is to suppress speech. Of course, a find-
ing that the desire to suppress speech caused the government's
action would not necessarily lead to invalidation because, per-
haps, the speech could constitutionally be suppressed. A court
could nevertheless use motivation analysis to identify instances
of covert suppression. Interestingly, although he suggests that
motivation analysis might be used in this way, Clark seems very
reluctant to use motivation analysis in this fashion as his discus-
sion of one of the cases that piqued interest in motivation analy-
sis shows.12
Clark says that because the statute in United States v.
O'Brienl' did not create a classification based on speech content,
"no strong presumption of illicit motivation arises," and thus the
government can justify its action by showing "only a rational con-
nection to a valid state interest." However, as Clark recognizes,
the facts surrounding the enactment of the ban on knowing de-
struction of a draft card provided very strong evidence that Con-
gress's purpose was to suppress a certain form of effective
12. Clark states that in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936), the
Court appropriately considered "specific, historical facts surrounding a particular
piece of legislation."
13. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
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communication of an unpopular point of view.14 It seems inconsis-
tent to argue that the judiciary should seek to ascertain whether
action is motivated or caused by a desire or a purpose to suppress
speech and at the same time maintain that O'Brien evidences no
such purpose. Imagine, for example, that instead of supressing
speech the case had involved a practice primarily engaged in by
blacks. Most would not consider the flimsy justifications offered
by the government sufficient to disprove racial prejudice, at least
if one were willing, like Simon and unlike the Supreme Court in
O'Brien, to accept evidence of motivation other than the infer-
ences that can be drawn from the terms of the legislation.
CONCLUSION
The content and the purpose of the justification process are two
of the most important and most perplexing issues in constitu-
tional law. These two articles show that motivation analysis may
explain and perhaps should constitute the function of the justifi-
cation process in certain areas of constitutional adjudication. Yet
the search for illicit motivation is neither a complete explanation
of what the courts have been doing nor a desirable prescription of
all that they should do. Nevertheless, these articles and the arti-
cles on which they build have done much to advance thinking
about the nature of constitutional limitations on governmental ac-
tion and the role of the judiciary in enforcing these limitations.
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